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PEOPLE V. SEXTON: INSURING AN
ABSURD RESULT THROUGH INFLEXIBLE
INTERPRETATION-THE COURT OF
APPEAL DENIES CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
TO A VICTIM'S INSURANCE COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
Court-ordered restitution is effective in reducing the societal
costs of crime.' It serves important goals which are often unsatisfied
through more traditional sentencing.' In ordering criminal defen-
dants to make restitution to crime victims, the courts financially
compensate the victims, punish or rehabilitate the offenders, and de-
ter future crime? Some studies show that criminal defendants are
less likely to become repeat offenders when ordered to make restitu-
tion to their victims.4
1. See Scott Peterson, Survey, Court-Ordered Criminal Restitution in Wash-
ington, 62 WASH. L. REv. 357,357 (1987). But cf. Thomas M. Kelly, Note, Where
Offenders Pay for Their Crimes: Victim Restitution and its Constitutionality, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 685, 694 (1984) (noting that offenders are rarely appre-
hended and convicted, and those who are may not have the financial resources
necessary to provide restitution to the victims).
Americans consider crime to be one of their main concerns. See Lori
Montgomery, Crime Causes Americans Most Worry, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Feb. 4, 1996, at A32 (showing the results of a Knight-Ridder poll in which crime
and drugs were cited as the nation's top concerns). Interestingly, crime rates
have fallen in California in recent years. The state Department of Justice re-
ported that the seven major crimes tracked by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion declined 9.9% in California in 1996. See James P. Sweeney, Crime is on the
Retreat in California, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 13, 1997, at Al.
2. See Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences
Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261,265 (1993).
3. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 357.
4. See Joe Hudson & Steven Chesney, Research on Restitution: A Review
and Assessment, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND AcriON 131, 138-
39 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1977) (showing that those who made resti-
tution were four times less likely to return to prison for new convictions than
those who did not). But see Elmar Weitekamp, Can Restitution Serve as a Rea-
sonable Alternative to Imprisonment? An Assessment of the Situation in the USA,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICtIM-
OFFENDER MEDIATION-INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECrIVES 81, 95
(Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992) (discussing a Texas study which
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Restitution restores persons to their original position prior to
loss or injury.5 When crime victims are harmed by criminal acts, it is
rational to award them compensation from defendants. Crimes,
however, cause injuries to persons other than those immediately in-
volved in the offense.6 One common victim is insurance companies.
For example, homeowners insurance companies suffer losses when
their policyholders are robbed and automobile insurers suffer losses
when drunk drivers collide with their insured vehicles. These situa-
tions require that judges determine whether they can order defen-
dants to pay restitution to victims other than those immediately in-
jured.7 In California, the answer to this question remains unclear.
In People v. Sexton' the California First District Court of Appeal
vacated a trial court decision that ordered the defendant, as a condi-
tion of his probation, to make restitution to the victim's insurance
company.9 At the trial court proceeding, the defendant pleaded
guilty0 to auto theft and the court ordered him to pay restitution to
the victim and the victim's insurer. 2 The court of appeal ruled that a
1994 amendment to state laws limited restitution to "direct" victims
of crime, thus excluding insurance companies who incur expenses be-
cause of their contractual obligations with the victim. 14 This result is
both inequitable and contrary to the underlying purposes of
found higher recidivism rates among participants in the Texas Restitution Center
Program).
5. See BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
6. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Propriety of Condition of Probation
Which Requires Defendant Convicted of Crime of Violence to Make Reparation to
Injured Victim, 79 A.L.R.3D 976,998-99 (1977).
7. See id. For example, a requirement that a defendant convicted of assault
with intent to commit murder pay restitution to two witnesses and to the insur-
ance company for the medical expenses of the complaining witness was upheld
by a Texas court. See Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974).
8. 33 Cal. App. 4th 64,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (1995).
9. See id. at 72, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
10. See id. at 66,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
11. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851(a) (West 1987 and Supp. 1997). The statute
punishes
[a]ny person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without
the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently
or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or posses-
sion of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or
any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the
driving or unauthorized taking or stealing.
Id.
12. See Sexton, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 68, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245.
13. See Act of Sept. 28, 1994, ch. 1106, 1994 Cal. Stat. 1106.
14. See Sexton, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 70-71, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
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restitution and the intent of California restitution law.
In three subsequent cases, the Fourth and Sixth Districts have
criticized the Sexton opinion and have concluded that an insurance
company is a victim entitled to criminal restitution.15 However, the
California Supreme Court denied review of the first two decisions,
issued by the Sixth and Fourth Districts, and ordered the opinions
depublished.16 In a third case published this May, the Fourth District
again criticized the Sexton decision and declined to follow its reason-
ing.1 7 In September, the California Supreme Court granted the de-
fendant's petition for review.
This Note examines the aforementioned cases and explores
whether a sentencing court should consider an insurance company a
victim under California restitution law. Part II explores the history
and purposes of restitution and the application of ordering restitution
to insurance companies in California. Part Ill examines the Sexton
decision, the first California Court of Appeal ruling to address this
controversy after the Legislature enacted the 1994 amendment to the
California Penal Code. Part IV briefly describes the California Court
of Appeal cases decided after Sexton. Part V analyzes this issue by
focusing on constitutional considerations, statutory interpretation,
and policy considerations. This Note concludes, in Part VI, that con-
struing the term "direct victim" broadly to include insurance compa-
nies under state restitution law advances the objectives of criminal
sentencing.
15. See People v. Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1997),
rev. granted, 943 P.2d 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 1997) (No.
S062379); People v. Nilsen, 41 Cal. App. 4th 936, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (1996)
(depublished Mar. 28, 1996); People v. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1779, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 302 (1995) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995). For a summary of these cases,
see infra Part IV.A-C.
16. See People v. Nilsen, 41 Cal. App. 4th 936, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (1996)
(depublished Mar. 28, 1996), appeal denied, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 1880 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 28, 1996) (No. S051740); People v. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1779, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 302 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 1995) (No. S048057) (depublished Oct. 26,
1995), appeal denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 6641 (1995). For a discussion on the
depublication of these cases, see infra Part IV.D.
17. See People v. Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1997),
rev. granted, 943 P.2d 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 1997) (No.
S062379).
18. See id. Chief Justice George and Justices Kennard, Baxter, Chin, and
Brown signed the petition order. See id.
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II. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
A. History of Restitution
Restitution is one of the oldest forms of criminal penalties.19
References to restitution, or "reparations" as it is also called, appear
in the Bible,20 Mosaic Law,21 and Ancient Greek history.' As the
state became the administrator of criminal law, restitution was gen-
erally separated from criminal law and became embedded in civil tort
law.u
Today, criminal courts order restitution to crime victims, pri-
marily in cases involving property crimes and in conjunction with
suspended sentences or probation. 2 All fifty states have adopted a
form of criminal restitution,u despite the general rule that civil courts
are the primary forum for recovering economic compensation for
wrongdoing. In fact, the Model Penal Code endorses restitution as
an appropriate part of a defendant's criminal sentence.'
19. See Linda F. Frank, The Collection of Restitution: An Often Overlooked
Service to Crime Victims, 8 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 107, 109 (1992). For
a discussion on the early history of restitution, see Richard E. Laster, Criminal
Restitution: A Survey of its Past History and an Analysis of its Present Usefulness,
5 U. RICH. L. REv. 71,71-80 (1970).
20. See Frank, supra note 19, at 109 (quoting Leviticus 6:4-5 (Revised Stan-
dard Version) ("When one has sinned and become guilty, he shall restore what
he took by robbery... or anything about which he has sworn falsely; he shall re-
store it in full .... ") and Exodus 22:1-3 (Revised Standard Version) ("[I]f a man
steals... [h]e shall make restitution.")).
21. See id. (Under Mosaic Law, the penalty for highway robbery could in-
clude restitution for up to five times the goods' value.)
22. See id. (stating that the Greeks required "death fines" to the murder vic-
tim's family).
23. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 686-87.
24. See Bruce R. Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by the Criminal Offender to
His Victim: Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern Correctional Proc-
ess, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 152, 155-56 (1970).
25. See Frank, supra note 19, at 111-12. As of 1988, laws in at least 23 states
required restitution in all criminal cases involving an economic loss. See id. at
111.
26. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.1(2),(2)(h) (Proposed Official Draft
1962). As a condition of probation, "[t]he Court, as a condition of its order, may
require the defendant.., to make restitution of the fruits of his crime or to make
reparation, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused
thereby." Id.
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B. Purposes of Criminal Restitution
Three factors influence the inclusion of restitution in the crimi-
nal justice system.. First, various authorities endorse the concept of
criminal restitution.u State adoptions of the Model Penal Code lan-
guage for criminal restitution exemplify this influence.29 Second, the
interest in "victimology" and the search for means to compensate
victims for their losses has significantly increased and is helping to
shape restitution statutes.3 Last, the federal government has demon-
strated its support of restitution by allocating millions of dollars to
fund such programs."
Restitution serves three purposes: rehabilitation, deterrence,
and compensation. The primary goal is rehabilitation. 2 By forcing
defendants to recognize the causal relationships between the crime
and the victim's loss, and the criminal behavior and the victim's loss,33
a sentencing court meets its rehabilitative aims by directing the de-
fendant to accept social responsibility for the perpetrated crime.'
27. See Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: As-
sessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52,58 (1982).
28. See id. These authorities include the American Law Institute, American
Bar Association, National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, and National Advisory Commis-
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. See Alan T. Harland, Compensat-
ing the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 203,205 n.8 (1978).
29. See Harland, supra note 27, at 58.
30. See id. "Victimology" is the study by criminologists of victim's role in
crime. See Richard Quinney, Who is the Victim?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY 314, 317
(1972).
31. See Harland, supra note 27, at 58 & n.41.
32. See People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d 97, 100, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 537, 540 (1976); see also Herbert Edelhertz, Legal and Operational Issues in
the Implementation of Restitution Within the Criminal Justice System, in
RESTiTUTION IN CRIMINAL JusTicE 64 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1977)
("[T]he [restitution] programs that are actually established invariably focus on
correction or rehabilitation of offenders. No restitution program has come to my
attention that had the delivery of benefits to victims as its primary or even very
important operational goal.").
33. See Charles R. Pengilly, Restitution, Retribution, and the Constitution, 7
ALASKA L. Rnv. 333, 344 (1990) (discussing how this tort concept of proximate
cause applies to the concept of restitution).
34. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986) (indicating that
"[r]estitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant
to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused"); People v.
Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d 97, 100-01, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540-41
(1976) ("Restitution... may serve the salutary purpose of making a criminal un-
derstand that he has harmed not merely society in the abstract but also individual
human beings, and that he has a responsibility to make them whole.").
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Second, restitution deters the criminal from future illegal activity."
The effectiveness of rehabilitation and deterrence is derived from the
direct relation between the crime and the amount of damage suffered
by the victim; by ordering restitution a court forces defendants to de-
finitively acknowledge the harm they have caused. 6 Last, restitution
serves the public policy goal of providing actual and efficient com-
pensation for the victims. This is a noble and necessary goal consid-
ering that most crime victims, according to the late U.S. Senator John
Heinz, are victimized by both the criminal and the criminal justice
system.' Restitution ensures that crime victims are compensated for
their losses without having to pursue independent and judicially inef-
ficient civil litigation.
C. California Criminal Restitution Law and its Application to
Insurance Companies
Restitution has been a part of California penal law since 1872.8
Although unused for many years because judges perceived it as inef-
fective, restitution became popular again during the victims' rights
movement which led to the passage of Proposition 8 in 1982."9 This
initiative amended the state constitution to require victim restitution
in all criminal cases where losses occur.'
1. The probation/non-probation dichotomy
Before the enactment of the 1994 amendments, 41 two separate
codes with two different definitions of "victim" provided the basis for
state restitution law. The Penal Code applied to restitution as a con-
dition of probation,' while the Government Code applied to
35. See People v. Goss, 109 Cal. App. 3d 443, 460, 167 Cal. Rptr. 224, 234
(1980); see also People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 486, 541 P.2d 545, 548, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 905, 908 (1975) ("[A]n order for restitution... has generally been deemed
a deterrent to future criminality.").
36. See Laster, supra note 19, at 80-81.
37. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 694.
38. See EDWIN VILLMOARE & JEANNE BENVENUTI, CALIFORNIA VICrIMS OF
CRIME HANDBOOK 85 (1988).
39. See id. at 85-86. Proposition 8 was popularly referred to as "The Victims'
Bill of Rights." See Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior
Misconduct Impeachment Evidence in California Criminal Cases, 24 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 621, 621 (1991).
40. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4 (West Supp. 1997).
42. See id. §§ 1203.04, 1203.1 (West 1994) (repealed 1994).
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restitution fines when the courts denied the defendant probation.43
Courts established that insurance companies were not victims under
the Government Code" because they did not fall within the definition
of "victim" outlined in California Government Code Section 13960.4*
Under California Penal Code Sections 1203.04 and 1203.1, however,
restitution awards were not restricted to immediate crime victims,6
and therefore courts could order defendants to pay restitution to in-
surance companies.' Hence, while insurance companies were not
entitled to restitution fines when a criminal was denied probation,
they were entitled to restitution as a condition of probation when
probation was granted.
This dichotomy in the law was not accidental; it existed because
43. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13967 (West 1992 and Supp. 1997) (amended
1994).
44. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1520, 255 Cal. Rptr. 778
(1989) (vacating a superior court order requiring the defendant to make restitu-
tion to the victim's insurance company under California Government Code Sec-
tion 13967).
45. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997) ("'Victim' means a
resident of the State of California, a member of the military stationed in Califor-
nia, or a family member living with a member of the military stationed in Cali-
fornia who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime."). See, e.g.,
People v. Franco, 19 Cal. App. 4th 175, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475 (1993) (denying res-
titution of worker compensation benefits to the victim's employer); People v.
Blankenship, 213 Cal. App. 3d 992,262 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1989) (denying restitution
to the property insurer in robbery case); People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. 3d
1520, 255 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1989) (upholding restitution of $250 to the victim for
the deductible amount of the collision insurance but prohibiting reimbursement
to the insurance company for the $1416 it had paid the victim for the loss). In
later cases, however, the California Supreme Court permitted restitution fines
for economic losses, not simply for physical injuries as referred to in section
13960. See, e.g., People v. Broussard, 5 Cal. 4th 1067, 856 P.2d 1134, 22 Cal. Rptr.
2d 278 (1993) (concluding that the legislative history of section 13967(c) shows
that the statute was not intended to be subject to section 13960's limited defini-
tion of "victim"); People v. Crow, 6 Cal. 4th 952, 864 P.2d 80, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1
(1993) (permitting a restitution fine following a conviction of aiding and abetting
welfare fraud).
46. See VILLMOARE & BENVENUrI, supra note 38, at 87.
47. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 14 Cal. App. 4th 939, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1993)
(holding that victim's insurer was entitled to restitution as a condition of proba-
tion in a residential burglary case); People v. Calhoun, 145 Cal. App. 3d 568, 193
Cal. Rptr. 394 (1983) (allowing restitution to an insurance company as a condi-
tion of probation where a convicted drunk driver caused injury to another);
People v. Alexander, 182 Cal. App. 2d 281, 6 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1960) (requiring
restitution to the victim's insurer for losses in an arson case). But cf. People v.
Wardlow, 227 Cal. App. 3d 360, 278 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1991) (denying restitution to
Medi-Cal for the costs of the victim's psychological therapy).
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the two statutes had different purposes.' The primary goal of order-
ing restitution as a condition of probation under the Penal Code was
to rehabilitate the criminal. In contrast, the restitution fine provision
under the Government Code was designed to compensate actual vic-
tims for their losses in cases where probation was denied.49
For example, in People v. Foster' the defendant was convicted of
residential burglary and argued that he should not be required to pay
restitution to the victim's homeowners insurance company as a con-
dition of his probation.51 He asserted that the disparate treatment of
an insurance company was an unintended anomaly.52 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal disagreed:
We have no difficulty harmonizing the statutes. The differ-
ent objectives of the probation statutes and the victim reim-
bursement provisions of the Government Code justify dif-
ferent applications of the term "victim." The Legislature
explicitly recognized this distinction by incorporating a de-
tailed definition of the term "victim" into the Government
Code, but not defining the term for purposes of section
1203. Thus, the Legislature left it open for an insurance
company to be treated differently under the two statutory
schemes.'
Therefore, the Foster court upheld a restitution order to Farmers In-
surance Group.'
2. The 1994 amendments
On September 28, 1994, Governor Pete Wilson approved legis-
lation that amended California law governing the rules of criminal
restitution.55 The legislation eliminated the legal distinction regard-
ing criminal restitution by deleting the applicable provisions of the
Government and Penal Codes and unifying them under Penal Code
Section 1202.4. The newly amended law specifically pronounced that
"[r]estitution is recognized to have a rehabilitative effect on
48. See Foster, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 949-50, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7 (1993).
49. See id.
50. 14 Cal. App. 4th 939, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1993).
51. See id. at 948, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
52. See id. at 951, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
53. Id. at 953, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
54. See id. at 955, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
55. See Act of Sept. 28, 1994, ch. 1106, 1994 Cal. Stat. 1106. This act was
passed as an urgency statute that became immediately effective when filed with
the Secretary of State's office on September 29, 1994. See id. § 9.
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criminals" and is "a deterrent to future criminality." 6
Included in this act was a new paragraph stating that "[n]othing
in this section shall prevent a court from ordering restitution to any
corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association,
joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or in-
strumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity when that en-
tity is a direct victim of a crime."'  Since the legislation specifically
referred to "direct victim[s]," a phrase nonexistent in prior versions
of the law, a legal question has arisen: can a sentencing court still or-
der a criminal defendant to pay restitution to an insurance company
that indemnifies the crime victim? The first appellate court case to
address this issue was People v. Sexton.
III. PEOPLE V. SEXTON
A. Facts
On April 9, 1993, police officers stopped a speeding vehicle with
a burned-out taillight. 9 Both persons in the car, including the defen-
dant, attempted to flee6 Police apprehended the defendant, who
admitted to having stolen the vehicle in Oregon. 1 On May 27, 1993,
he failed to appear for a preliminary hearing but, after the issuance of
a bench warrant, surrendered to authorities on July 7, 1993.62
The probation officer's report indicates that the vehicle owner
stated that "there was extensive damage done to the interior of her
car, and the car ha[d] numerous scratches."6' Her automobile insur-
ance deductible was $350." Her automobile insurance carrier, All-
state Insurance Company, paid for the remainder of the damage.
At the sentencing hearing, the court placed the defendant on
three years probation, which included orders to pay $200 to the state
victims' fund, $350 to the victim to cover the insurance deductible, a
56. Id. § 1(b),(c).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(p) (West Supp. 1996) (repealed 1996)
(emphasis added) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(k)) (West
Supp. 1997).
58. 33 Cal. App. 4th 64,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (1995).
59. See id. at 67,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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$225 pre-sentence investigation fee, and a monthly $25 supervision
fee."6 The defendant, disputing the claimed vehicle damage, re-
quested a restitution hearing.'
At the hearing, the victim stated that the "[d]ollar amount of loss
and/or medical expenses" was $3317.95.' The victim's portion of this
loss was the deductible amount of $350 and $25 in other unreim-
bursed expenses." Allstate incurred the remaining loss of $2942.95.70
The court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the full
amount of $3317.95 in installments to the victim and Allstate.' The
defendant appealed to the court of appeal, arguing that the lower
court erred in ordering the restitution payment to the victim's insur-
ance company.=
B. Judicial Reasoning
While the case was awaiting appeal, the state enacted the
amendment to the California Penal Code which included the "direct
victim" language.3 The Sexton court concluded that the enacted
amendment was dispositive and clearly implied that a sentencing
court cannot order restitution to indirect victims.74 Writing for the
court of appeal, Justice Michael J. Phelan ruled that the use of the
term "direct victim" clearly implies that the statute no longer allows
restitution to an "indirect victim."75
As a result, the court of appeal vacated the lower court order di-
recting the defendant to pay restitution to Allstate and remanded the
case to the sentencing court.76 The Legislature's 1994 amendment
was interpreted as clearly intending to exclude entities that are not
66. See id. at 67,39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. This included $1714.32 for physical damage repairs, $704.85 for
vehicle content replacement, and $393.50 to transport the automobile back to the
victim's home in Oregon, buy new license plates, and re-register the car. See id.
71. See id. at 68-69, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245. The order stated, in part, that
"[t]he evidence presented establishes that as a result of the acts of the defendant
and others the Allstate Insurance Company was damaged in the sum of $2942.95
and the owner of the vehicle.., was damaged in the sum of $375.00. The resti-
tution sum is fixed at $3317.95." Id. at 69 n.2, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245 n.2.
72. See id. at 69, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245.
73. See id. at 70, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 72, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
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direct victims.' Thus, the court of appeal held that "an insurer who
has incurred expenses solely by virtue of a contractual duty to in-
demnify the direct victim is not itself an 'object' of the crime and
hence not a direct victim.""8 The court of appeal, however, added
that a trial court still has the discretion to order a defendant to make
restitution payable to the immediate crime victim and "leave it to the
insurer and the victim-insured to work out repayment under the
terms of their insurance contract., 79 Thus, the court may require the
defendant to pay restitution commensurate to the amount of the in-
surance company's loss to the immediate victim.'
IV. SUBSEQUENT CALIFORNIA CASES
Since the Sexton decision, the California Court of Appeal has
decided three cases on the issue of whether an insurance company is
a victim under California restitution law. In these cases, the court of
appeal has refused to follow the Sexton reasoning and determined
that an insurance company is a victim entitled to restitution under the
Penal Code.8'
A. People v. Correia
Four months after Sexton, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
decided the case of People v. Correia,' which involved a successful
criminal prosecution for assaulte and battery 4 stemming from a
multi-party physical altercation that took place outside a wedding re-
ception.' The victim sustained several injuries, including a broken
77. See id. at 71, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 72, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
80. See id.
81. See People v. Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1445, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587,
591 (1997), rev. granted, 943 P.2d 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3,
1997) (No. S062379); People v. Nilsen, 41 Cal. App. 4th 936, 945, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
858, 863 (1996) (depublished Mar. 28, 1996); People v. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th
1779, 1789-90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 302, 307 (1995) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
82. 36 Cal. App. 4th 1779, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 302 (1995) (depublished Oct. 26,
1995).
83. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1988) ("An assault is an unlawful at-
tempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another.").
84. See id. § 242 ("A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or vio-
lence upon the person of another.").
85. See Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1783, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 303 (depublished
Oct. 26, 1995).
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palate, upper jaw, and nose.' The sentencing court ordered the de-
fendants, who did not sustain any injuries, to pay restitution to Kaiser
Health Plan, which paid for the victim's medical treatmentY The
court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that Kaiser, though not the im-
mediate victim of the crime, was closely related to the direct victim."
B. People v. Nilsen
On January 5, 1996, the Sixth District Court of Appeal decided
People v. Nilsen.9 At trial, a bookkeeper pleaded no contest to a fel-
ony charge of grand theft from her employer, a dentist,9 and the
court ordered her to pay restitution, including money to an insurance
company that had paid $10,000 for the loss. 2 The court of appeal af-
firmed this decision, agreeing with the People that Sexton was
wrongly decided and that state law did not prohibit trial courts from
ordering defendants to pay restitution to all victims of their crimes
who suffer a loss.'
C. People v. Birkett
On May 14, 1997, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided
People v. Birkett a case in which the defendant pleaded guilty to
owning a chop shop 95 and receiving stolen property.96 After a restitu-
tion hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution
as a condition of his probation to two insurance companies that had
86. See id. (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
87. See id. (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
88. See id. at 1788 n.14, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 306 n.14 (depublished Oct. 26,
1995). The reasoning of this case is discussed infra Part V.
89. 41 Cal. App. 4th 936, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (1996) (depublished Mar. 28,
1996).
90. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 484, 487(b)(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997)
("Grand theft is theft committed... [w]here the money, labor, or real or per-
sonal property is taken by a servant, agent, or employee from his or her principal
or employer and aggregates four hundred dollars ($400) or more in any 12 con-
secutive month period.").
91. See Nilsen, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 938, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859 (depublished
Mar. 28, 1996).
92. See id. at 940,48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860-61 (depublished Mar. 28, 1996).
93. See id. at 943, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862 (depublished Mar. 28, 1996). The
reasoning of this case is discussed infra Part V.
94. 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1997), rev. granted, 943 P.2d
723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 1997) (No. S062379).
95. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 10801 (West Supp. 1997). A chop shop is a
premise where illegally obtained vehicles are sold or altered to prevent identifi-
cation. See id. § 250.
96. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
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indemnified two of the victims.9 The court of appeal upheld this or-
der and determined that insurance companies are entitled to restitu-
tion if they suffer consequences of crime by indemnifying their poli-
cyholders."
D. California Supreme Court Reaction
The California Supreme Court has denied review for both the
Nilsen and Correia decisions and ordered these cases depublished.99
Thus, until the Birkett decision in May of 1997, Sexton was the only
officially reported case since the codification of the 1994 amendments
addressing whether an insurance company that pays for the criminal
victim's loss is entitled to restitution.
Depublished opinions, which normally appear in the advance
sheets, are deleted from the official bound volumes of cases."° Cali-
fornia law prohibits parties and courts from using these opinions as
precedent in court proceedings.'01 The reasons for depublication are
not entirely clear. California Rule of Court 979(e), adopted in 1990,
cautions against assuming that supreme court depublication signals
supreme court disapproval: "An order of the supreme court directing
depublication of an opinion in the official reports shall not be
deemed an expression of opinion of the supreme court of the cor-
rectness of the result reached by the decision or of any of the law set
forth in the opinion."'2 It is shortsighted, however, to assume this is
97. See Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1441, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589.
98. See id. at 1445, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591. The reasoning of this case is dis-
cussed infra Part V.
99. See People v. Nilsen, 41 Cal. App. 4th 936, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (1996)
(depublished Mar. 28, 1996); People v. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1779, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 302 (1995) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
100. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Publication and Depublication of California Court
of Appeal Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightier than the Pencil?, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1007, 1011 (1993).
101. See CAL. Cr. R. 977(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997). Few court of appeal
decisions are published in the official reports. In fiscal year 1994-1995, the court
of appeal published only eight percent of all majority opinions and four percent
of all criminal appeals. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT 94 tbl.10 (1996). In the five year period between April 1, 1987 and
March 31, 1992, 586 court of appeal opinions were depublished. See Uelmen, su-
pra note 100, at 1007 & n.3.
102. CAL. Cr. R. 979(e) (West 1996). Prior to the enactment of this statute,
depublication was generally regarded as demonstrating supreme court disap-
proval. See People v. Dee, 222 Cal. App. 3d 760, 764, 272 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210
(1990) ("[I]t is generally accepted that most depublication occurs because the
court considers the opinion to be wrong in some significant way, usually in rea-
soning and sometimes in result as well.").
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the actual practice. Despite Rule 979(e), there is no reason to think
the court has not continued its practice of depublishing opinions
when found "to be wrong in some significant way, such that it would
mislead the bench and bar if it remained as citable precedent."'' 3
In the 1994 case of Conrad v. Ball Corp., the court of appeal
noted that the supreme court depublished one case but denied
depublishing the other in conflicting opinions published one month
apart."4 The court of appeal wrote that this suggested that "the
[California] Supreme Court approved of the case it chose to leave
published."'' 5 This interpretation is in accord with how the late Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus once plainly described the
effect of depublication: "When we [the supreme court] are faced
with two conflicting opinions, and we decertify one of them, you
don't have to be a genius to figure out what we're thinking.
'
)11
6
In depublishing Correia and Nilsen and denying review of these
cases, the supreme court left Sexton as the only published case ad-
dressing whether an insurance company should be considered a vic-
tim under California restitution law. This action tacitly shows ap-
proval of the Sexton ruling.
On September 3, 1997, however, the supreme court granted re-
view of the Birkett decision and thus the appellate court opinion has
been superseded.1" By granting review, the supreme court has the
opportunity to overrule Sexton and affirm the Birkett ruling.
V. ANALYSIS
The Sexton decision is currently the only citable case since the
codification of the 1994 amendments discussing whether sentencing
courts may order defendants to pay restitution to insurance compa-
nies who reimburs'e victims for losses caused by defendants' criminal
acts. This decision implicates state constitutional, statutory, and
103. Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme
Court, 72 CAL. L. Rv. 514,514-15 (1984).
104. 24 Cal. App. 4th 439, 443 n.2, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441, 444 n.2 (1994) (citing
the published opinion of Espinoza v. Machonga, 9 Cal. App. 4th 268, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 498 (1992) and the depublished opinion of Romero v. Derdendzhayana,
No. B062996 (Oct. 27, 1992)).
105. Id. at 444 n.2, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444 n.2.
106. Ellis J. Horvitz, Otto Kaus Remembered, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 961, 962
(1997).
107. See People v. Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1997),
rev. granted, 943 P.2d 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 1997) (No.
S062379). Cases superseded by a grant of review by the supreme court are not
published. See CAL. Cr. R. 977(d) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997).
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relevant policy issues related to victim restitution.
A. Constitutional Analysis
In California, the state constitution and statutes require victim
restitution.1 'O On June 8, 1982, California voters ratified Proposition
8, commonly known as the "Victims' Bill of Rights," which added
Article I, Section 28 to the state constitution.' A section of this
amendment states California's broad restitution provision:
It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the
State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a re-
sult of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution
from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suf-
fer.
Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted per-
sons in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition
imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss, unless com-
pelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary.1
This Article requires the implementation of this constitutional
provision into statutory law,"' which can presently be found in Cali-
fornia Penal Code Section 1202.4.12 Article I, Section 28(b) was de-
signed to "require convicted persons to pay restitution to the victims
of their crimes 'in every case. ' '' " Thus, Penal Code Section 1202.4 is
based upon the constitutionally codified principle that all convicts
pay restitution to "all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal
activity."
1 4
The 1994 amendments did not alter this intent in any way. The
legislation discusses the constitutional right to restitution for "all
108. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f) (West
Supp. 1997) ("In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a re-
sult of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make
restitution to the victim or victims .... ).
109. See Goldberg, supra note 39, at 621.
110. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (emphasis added).
111. See id.
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(b) states that "[i]n every case where a person
is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitu-
tion fine." This Code section further states that "[t]he restitution fine shall be set
at the discretion of the court and commensurate with the seriousness of the of-
fense." Id. § 1202.4(b)(1).
113. People v. Young, 38 Cal. App. 4th 560, 565, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 180
(1995) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)).
114. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
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persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity""' and then
indicates that "[t]he right of persons to receive restitution for losses
suffered as a result of criminal activity shall be secured as provided in
this act.'. 6 This law, on which the Sexton court based its denial of
restitution, is intended to effectuate the constitutional guarantee of
restitution to all persons suffering losses resulting from criminal ac-
tivity. In cases where there is a victim, courts must order victim resti-
tution.
In denying restitution to an insurance company, however, the
court of appeal in Sexton did not address these underlying constitu-
tional implications. At no point did the court of appeal refer to the
state constitutional provision or principle.
Insurance companies should qualify under Article I, Section
28(b) as "persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity.".. 7
They are corporate entities that pay for the harm caused by the file-
gal acts of defendants. Restitution would allocate money to insurers
who assume the financial risk of loss and are legally obligated to
provide financial indemnification to immediate crime victims. In de-
nying restitution, a court instead places the burden on insurance
companies to pay for injuries caused by criminal acts. The insurance-
buying public pays for these expenditures"' since, when taken in the
aggregate, higher losses require higher underwriting premiums.'
This essentially shifts the loss from the criminal to the general public.
Restitution, however, would place the loss on the harm-causing party
yet still fulfill the objectives of rehabilitating the criminal and deter-
ring criminal activity.
The Nilsen, Correia, and Birkett courts addressed these constitu-
tional considerations. In Nilsen, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
pointed out that Article I, Section 28(b) does not restrict restitution
to direct victims of criminal activity."2 Moreover, the court of appeal
held that instead of excluding non-natural entities, such as insurance
115. Act of Sept. 28, 1994, ch. 1106, §1 (a), 1994 Cal. Stat. 1106.
116. Id. §1 (d).
117. Id. §1 (a).
118. See Lorraine Slavin and David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora's
Box-The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 507, 525-26 (1984) (concluding that insurance com-
panies should receive restitution under a federal criminal restitution law).
119. The main sources of income for insurance companies are premium in-
come and investment income. See BARRY D. SMITH ET AL., PROPERTY AND
LiABmiTy INSURANCE PRINCIPLES 154 (1987).
120. People v. Nilsen, 41 Cal. App. 4th 936, 943, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858, 862
(1996) (depublished Mar. 28, 1996).
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companies, the provision broadly requires restitution to all persons
suffering losses." Applying this constitutional provision, the court of
appeal found that "[a] flexible interpretation of the term "victim"
best addresses the purposes of the statute. ' m
In Correia the Fourth District directly questioned the reasoning
of the Sexton decision by asserting that "restricting restitution to di-
rect victims conflicts with the broad constitutional provision which
contains no such limitation."'' The Fourth District in Birkett found
that since the constitution provides the right to restitution to all per-
sons who suffer losses resulting from crimes, the Sexton rationale is
inconsistent with the state constitution.12 4
The Sexton court's narrow interpretation of criminal restitution
awards conflicts with the broad principle approved by the voters and
codified into the state constitution. As the court of appeal stated in
Correia, "since [California Penal Code Section 1202.4] was enacted to
implement the constitutional provision, we construe it in a manner
consistent with the constitutional provision and, if possible, in a man-
ner so that it is constitutional. '
B. Statutory Analysis
Determining whether a court may order a defendant to pay resti-
tution to an insurance company depends on whether an insurer
qualifies under the "direct victim" language of California Penal Code
Section 1202.4. This is a matter of statutory interpretation.
1. Statutory interpretation in California
Courts should interpret statutes to carry out their legislative in-
tent.2 California courts have often recognized that literal statutory
121. See id. (depublished Mar. 28, 1996).
122. Id. at 943, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862-63 (depublished Mar. 28, 1996) (quoting
People v. Foster, 14 Cal. App. 4th 939, 953, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 9 (1993)).
123. People v. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1779, 1788, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 302, 306
(1995) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
124. People v. Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1444, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587, 591
(1997), rev. granted, 943 P.2d 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3,
1997) (No. S062379).
125. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1785, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 304 (depublished
Oct. 26, 1995) (referring to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.04 (West Supp. 1997)).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.04 was repealed effective August 3, 1995 and replaced
simultaneously by CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4.
126. This is consistent with the rule of statutory construction of federal law es-
tablished by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett,
421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (stating that courts are to ascertain congressional intent
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construction is inappropriate when the result is contrary to the ap-
parent legislative intent.w
In re Haines,m a 1925 case often cited by courts in discussing
statutory interpretation,2 established the rule for statutory construc-
tion in California.' Justice Lawlor's majority opinion held that a
felony-escape provision, despite contrary statutory language, applied
to a prison escape by a misdemeanant." The supreme court ruled
that when the legislative intent is shown, a statute must be liberally
construed to effectuate that intent: "[w]hen a statute is fairly suscep-
tible of two constructions, one leading inevitably to mischief or ab-
surdity and the other consisting of sound sense and wise policy, the
former should be rejected and the latter adopted."'
Where a penal statute is reasonably susceptible of two construc-
tions, a court must ordinarily adopt the construction more favorable
to the defendant; this principle, however, does not apply "unless two
reasonable interpretations of the same provision stand in relative
equipoise."' 3
Other judges disagree with this method of statutory construction
and instead adopt a strict construction viewpoint. 4  The late
and follow legislative will); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,
542 (1940) (stating that courts must interpret statutes so as to give effect to con-
gressional intent).
127. See, e.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755 P.2d 299, 304,
248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1988); People v. Belton, 23 Cal. 3d 516,526,591 P.2d 485,
491-92, 153 Cal. Rptr. 195, 201-02 (1979); People v. Crowles, 20 Cal. App. 4th
114, 118, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 379 (1993); People v. Mesa, 265 Cal. App. 2d 746,
749, 71 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596-97 (1968).
128. 195 Cal. 605,234 P. 88 (1925).
129. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 85 Cal. App. 3d 916, 924-25, 149 Cal. Rptr. 777,
782 (1978); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. California Milk Pro-
ducers Advisory Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 433, 446, 147 Cal. Rptr. 265, 273 (1978);
Marina Village v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 61 Cal. App.
3d 388, 393, 132 Cal. Rptr. 120, 123 (1976); Kauke v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist.,
46 Cal. App. 2d 176, 185, 115 P.2d 576,581 (1941); Southern Pac. Co. v. Riverside
County, 35 Cal. App. 2d 380,384-85, 95 P.2d 688, 691 (1939).
130. See In re Haines, 195 Cal. at 613,234 P. at 886.
131. See id. at 622, 234 P. at 889.
132. Id. at 613, 234 P. at 886.
133. People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 599, 758 P.2d 1165, 1173, 250 Cal. Rptr.
635, 643 (1988); see also People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1145-46, 742 P.2d
1306, 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 609-10 (1987) (stating that a defendant is entitled
to the benefit of every realistic reasonable doubt in the interpretation of a stat-
ute).
134. See, e.g., State v. Fryer, 496 N.W.2d 54 (S.D. 1993). The South Dakota
Supreme Court ruled that an insurance company was only indirectly injured and
was not a victim under the "ordinary and popular meaning [of] the term." Id. at
55.
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California Supreme Court Justice Roger J. Traynor adopted this po-
sition to argue that In re Haines should be overturned.?15 In a dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Traynor refused to circumvent the plain language
of the legislation in order to find a misdemeanor escape crime:
Misdemeanants are excluded because felons are singled out
in a qualifying phrase that states what it means in the sim-
plest terms. The court cannot reject its obvious interpreta-
tion without denying all assurance that an act of the Legisla-
ture will be interpreted to mean what it says. It is for the
Legislature and not the court, to confirm the omission if it
was intended, or to correct it if it was not.36
To aid the process of statutory interpretation, the California Pe-
nal Code specifically includes a section on interpreting the code. This
provision states that "[t]he rule of the common law, that penal stat-
utes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All
its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their
terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice."'' 7 Al-
though the Haines court followed this more liberal standard of statu-
tory interpretation, the Sexton court restricted itself to strictly inter-
preting the statutory language.
2. Proper statutory interpretation shows that the Legislature
intended to expand, not restrict, restitution awards
The central argument of the Sexton opinion was that the Legisla-
ture intended to limit restitution awards by incorporating the "direct
victim" language into the statute?8 As the court of appeal stated,
The Legislature's reference to "direct" victims manifestly
incorporates the well-established dichotomy existing in the
law which distinguishes between "direct" and "indirect"
victims for purposes of restitution. A "direct" victim is the
"object" of the crime committed. By authorizing restitution
orders limited to entities which are "direct" victims, the
Legislature necessarily intended to exclude entities which
are "indirect" victims from such authorization .... [T]he
135. See In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130-32, 130 P.2d 384, 387-88 (1942)
(Traynor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 131, 130 P.2d at 387 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1988).
138. See People v. Sexton, 33 Cal. App. 4th 64, 70, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 246
(1995).
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Legislature knows how to define and include indirect vic-
tims if it chooses to do sot 9
The court of appeal, however, apparently disregarded the be-
ginning of Section 1202.4 which states the intent of criminal restitu-
tion fines: "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime
who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime
shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that
crime.""' This stated intent remained unchanged in the 1994
amendments. Thus, contrary to the Sexton court's analysis, it is un-
likely that the Legislature "necessarily intended"'14 to narrow restitu-
tion awards in passing the 1994 amendments.
In fact, by enacting the 1994 amendments, the Legislature ap-
pears to have actually intended to expand restitution awards. This
interpretation was asserted by Justice Daniel J. Kremer in the Cor-
reia opinion.' 42 In the 1994 amendments, the Legislature deleted the
requirement that restitution be subject to a determination of a per-
son's ability to pay and instead made that determination only a factor
for judges to consider. 43 Furthermore, restitution fines were made
available for misdemeanor offenses and restitution orders became
enforceable as civil judgments."4 Justice Kremer noted that the legis-
lative history states that these amendments taken together were in-
tended "to expand the ability of the victims to receive restitution.'
141
Instead of expanding restitution awards, literally construing the
"direct victim" language limits restitution orders to only the immedi-
ate objects of crime. Thus, insurance companies which incur pecuni-
ary losses resulting from the criminal acts of defendants are denied
restitution. This result is contrary to the Legislature's apparent in-
tent in passing the 1994 amendments-to broaden restitution awards
in order to further the rehabilitative and deterrent goals of restitu-
tion. Judges should not strictly construe statutes when the result is
contrary to the clear legislative intent. When determining a statute's
legislative intent, the supreme court has ruled that the "language of a
statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result
139. Id. at 70-71, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 246 (citations omitted).
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
141. Sexton, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 71, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
142. People v. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1779, 1788, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 302, 306
(1995) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
143. See id. at 1788,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 306 (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
144. See id. (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
145. Id. (quoting ASSEMBLY PUB. SAFETY COMM., ANALYSIS OF A.B. No.
3169 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1994, comments, para. 1 (1994)).
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in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend." '16
When this occurs, "[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter
will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act."'147
Instead of reading the 1994 amendments together to determine
their intended meaning, the Sexton court based its ruling on inter-
preting one phrase, specifically the words "direct victim." This
method of statutory interpretation is misguided. As the supreme
court stated in Lungren v. Deukmejian,' "[t]he meaning of a statute
may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words
must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same
subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible." '149 The
Sexton court's strict interpretation of the term "victim" from an iso-
lated statutory phrase prohibits non-entities such as insurance com-
panies and government agencies from receiving restitution for losses
resulting from criminal activity when they are not the immediate vic-
tim. This reading of the law fails to effectuate the Legislature's aim
of expanding restitution awards.
3. Even an isolated reading of former section 1202.4(p) can be
interpreted as expanding restitution awards
Had they truly intended to restrict restitution awards, the Legis-
lature could have specifically excluded indirect victims or insurance
companies. Despite prior cases ruling that indirect victims were eli-
gible to receive restitution,'5 the Legislature did not define the term
"victim" to exclude indirect victims in the 1994 amendments.'
Therefore, even if one does not read the amendments together
in order to determine the legislative intent, as the Sexton court did,
reading the specific clause which includes the "direct victim" lan-
guage still reveals an intent to expand restitution awards. The
amendment's analysis by the Office of the Attorney General alluded
to the existing Government Code definition of "victim," which in-
cluded only state residents or stationed military personnel and their
families. 52 Then, the analysis stated that "[t]his bill would specify
146. Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 673, 423 P.2d 193, 198, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265,
270 (1967).
147. Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 755 P.2d 299, 304, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 115, 120 (1988).
148. 45 Cal. 3d 727,755 P.2d 299,248 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1988).
149. Id. at 735,755 P.2d at 304,248 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
150. See cases cited supra note 47.
151. See Act of Sept. 28, 1994, ch. 1106, §1(a), 1994 Cal. Stat. 1106.
152. See SENATE RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF A.B. No. 3169 (1993-1994 Reg.
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that nothing in these provisions regarding restitution shall prevent a
court from ordering restitution to any... legal or commercial entity
when that entity is a direct victim of a crime." ' The amendment was
designed to clarify state law to show that courts shall not be pre-
vented from ordering restitution to non-person entities. While the
amendment prevents courts from denying restitution to direct vic-
tims, it does not in any way prohibit restitution to indirect victims.
In both the Correia and Birkett opinions, the court of appeal em-
phasized that the Legislature did not intend to limit restitution orders
by using the "direct victim" language.'4 Justice Kremer wrote in
Correia:
If the Legislature had intended to prohibit a court from
conditioning probation on a restitution order to a corpora-
tion or governmental entity which was an "indirect" victim,
the Legislature easily could have so provided by stating res-
titution to such an entity was permitted "only when a direct
victim" or by stating the court shall not order restitution to
such an entity when it was an "indirect" victim.15
A 1996 amendment did change the wording of Section 1202.4 to
incorporate the "direct victim" language into an official definition:
For purposes of this section, "victim" shall include the im-
mediate surviving family of the actual victim. "Victim" shall
also include any corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, association, joint venture, government, gov-
ernmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any
other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct
victim of a crime. " '
The Legislature, again, neither restricted restitution only to direct
victims nor expressly prohibited restitution to indirect victims."
Sess.), para. 9 (1994).
153. Id. para. 10.
154. See Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1789, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 306-07
(depublished Oct. 26, 1995); Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1444, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d
587, 591 (1997), rev. granted, 943 P.2d 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 3, 1997) (No. S062379).
155. Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1789, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 306-07 (depublished
Oct. 26, 1995); see also Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1444, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591
(stating that the Legislature could have limited restitution to direct victims only
but did not do so).
156. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(k) (West Supp. 1997).
157. See id.
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4. The Correia concurrence searches for common ground
The concurrence in Correia warned that the majority opinion
was overbroad in defining the term "victim" in a generalized man-
ner.15 To exemplify this principle, Judge Herbert B. Hoffman, a su-
perior court judge sitting on the court of appeal under assignment by
the Chairperson of the Judicial Council, presented the following hy-
pothetical scenario:
[A]n arsonist who, in the process of setting fire to a particu-
lar business, consequently causes neighboring businesses to
lose profits as a result of closed-off access from fire trucks
and other emergency and rescue vehicles. Under the broad
definition of "victim" suggested by the majority, all neigh-
boring business owners would be entitled to restitution be-
cause they suffered losses as a result of criminal activity."l
Judge Hoffman warned that the majority's view would burden pro-
bation departments with identifying all indirect victims"" and trial
courts with claims by all those who have suffered remote losses.161
Yet Judge Hoffman agreed that the sentencing court properly
ordered restitution to Kaiser Health Plan. 2 He argued that Kaiser,
because of its contractual duty to pay for the victim's medical serv-
ices, stands in the shoes of the victim." This protects the insurer un-
der an established subrogation principle that "permits a party who
has been required to satisfy a loss created by a third party's wrong to
step into the shoes of the loser and recover from the wrongdoer."'"M
Judge Hoffman's approach recognizes that the "direct victim"
language of the statute restricts restitution by preventing remote
crime victims from receiving restitution awards."5 It does not, how-
ever, prevent restitution awards to an insurance company that has in-
demnified immediate crime victims and takes over their legal
158. See Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th. at 1792, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 308 (Hoffman,
J., concurring) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
159. Id. (Hoffman, J., concurring) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
160. See id., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309 (Hoffman, J., concurring) (depublished
Oct. 26, 1995).
161. See id. at 1793, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309 (Hoffman, J., concurring)
(depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
162. See id. at 1792, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 308 (Hoffman, J., concurring)
(depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
163. See id. (Hoffman, J., concurring) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
164. Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 132, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 360,365 (1979) (disapproved on other grounds).
165. See Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 1792,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 308 (Hoffman, J.,
concurring) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995).
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recovery rights.1" An insurance company is entitled to recovery since
it analogously "steps into the shoes" of an immediate victim because
of a contractual obligation and is subrogated to the victim's right to
legal recovery, which should include criminal restitution awards. 67
The Birkett court incorporated this rationale in its decision. The
court of appeal ruled that "once an insurance company has indemni-
fied the victim of a crime, the insurance company stands in the shoes
of the victim and is therefore entitled to restitution from the perpe-
trator of the crime."1" Justice Betty Richli pointed out that although
the Sexton opinion defines direct victims as the objects of crime, an
insurer, although not the criminal object, can still be the direct vic-
tim.169 This is true especially when the insurance company has paid
the policyholder for the loss before the sentencing court has issued
the restitution order or before the police have even apprehended the
criminal.' Thus, the court of appeal reasoned that "insurance com-
panies are in essence the direct victims of [a] defendant's criminal
conduct."'7'
This rationale is consistent with the only other published Cali-
fornia case to interpret the direct victim statutory language. In Peo-
ple v. Ortiz, the Second District Court of Appeal upheld a probation
condition which required the defendant, convicted of possessing
counterfeit cassette tapes, to make restitution to the Association of
Latin American Record Manufacturers (ALARM)." Although
ALARM members-the individual record companies-were the ac-
tual immediate crime victims, the court of appeal determined that the
non-profit association, formed to combat crime against its members,
166. See id. For an introductory discussion on the principle of subrogation, see
SMITH ET AL., supra note 119, at 87-88. An example of a subrogation clause in an
insurance policy is as follows:
In the event of any payment under this policy, the company shall be sub-
rogated to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor against any per-
son or orgzation and the insured shall execute and deliver instru-
ments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such
rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
MERCURY GENERAL CORP., POLICY PROVISIONS 6 (1995).
167. See Correia, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1792, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 308 (Hoffman, J.,
concurring) (depublished Oct. 26, 1995). But see Williams, 207 Cal. App. 3d at
1524, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (overturning a restitution order, the court considered
a civil judgment for damages against the victim, payable to the insurer on a sub-
rogation theory).
168. Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1443, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
169. See id. at 1443, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
170. See id. at 1443-44, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
171. Id. at 1443, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
172. 53 Cal. App. 4th 791,794, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 66,67 (1997).
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stood in the shoes of the direct victims and was entitled to criminal
restitution. 3 The court of appeal reasoned that since the individual
companies comprising ALARM would be entitled to restitution as
direct victims, there is no reason why these companies cannot form
an association to collect restitution on their behalf.74 Similarly, if in-
dividual policyholders are entitled to criminal restitution, it is ra-
tional to allow their insurance companies to collect the losses on their
behalf.
C. Policy Considerations
The Sexton court did agree with the Office of the State Attorney
General that a defendant should not be excused from paying restitu-
tion simply because of the fortuity that the victim was insured. 5
Therefore, the court of appeal ruled that trial courts may order resti-
tution to victims and leave it to the insurers and victims to work out
repayment under the contractual terms of the insurance policy.76
This approach is misguided and problematic both in cases where full
restitution is ordered and where full restitution is not ordered. 7
1. Cases where full restitution is ordered to the victim
When courts award restitution to victims already compensated
by their insurance company, victims will often recover twice for their
losses. In some cases, victims are unaware of their contractual obli-
gation of subrogation which requires them to repay their insurer.
This is especially true because insurance companies are not a party to
the litigation and are only likely to become aware of a restitution
award from the victim directly. In other cases, victims, knowing that
the insurer is unaware of the criminal proceeding, may decide not to
pay back their insurance company.7 8 These two scenarios actually
173. See id.
174. See id. at 796, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 68-69.
175. See Sexton, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 71-72, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
176. See id. at 72, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247. If an insurance company pursues its
subrogation rights against the defendant for the loss, the defendant is entitled to
a credit for payments made to the victim. See id.
177. But see State v. Rose, 609 P.2d 875, 876-77 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (awarding
restitution for value of stolen car even though the victim was contractually obli-
gated to reimburse insurer).
178. A 1991 nationwide poll showed that 23% of adults believe it is acceptable
to lie to an auto insurance company. See Kenneth Reich, Survey Finds Many
Condone Lying to Insurers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1991, at A26. Regarding the
poll results, Andrea Margolis of the Josephson Institute for Advancement of
Ethics stated the following: "These things go on all the time when it comes to
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place victims in a better position than they were prior to the loss,
rather than restoring them to their rightful position. Ironically, the
Sexton approach allows one party-the victim-to be unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another-the insurer. This is a principle that
restitution seeks to avoid. 9
In addition, even if insurance companies become aware of resti-
tution payments made to their policyholders, it may be expensive or
impossible to collect compensation owed by exercising their subro-
gation rights. If the policyholder is uncooperative, the insurer will
need to file suit, obtain a civil judgment, and collect. This is costly
and may be difficult to accomplish with speed and accuracy. For
smaller judgments, insurance companies may find it economically ad-
vantageous not to pursue their subrogation rights and instead allow
the victims to reap double-recovery. These judgments may be easier
to write off as losses which can be recovered through higher under-
writing premiums. This will negatively affect the insurance-buying
public in California, which is already burdened with very high insur-
ance rates."80
Furthermore, if an insurance company seeks repayment from the
victim, the victim bears a burden in having to litigate with the insurer.
Some victims, unaware of the insurer's right of subrogation, could be
forced into costly litigation. This judicially inefficient consequence
victimizes crime victims a second time by making them civil defen-
dants in unnecessary cases in an already overcrowded state court sys-
tem." ' Awarding restitution directly to the insurer eliminates a layer
people and money .... People tend to rationalize these issues very regularly.
It's enhanced in this case because it's insurance. There's an emotional reaction
to the insurance industry. Many people, including my own mother, feel they're
getting ripped off." Id.
The National Insurance Crime Bureau estimates that American house-
holds pay an average of $200 a year in increased premiums to compensate for in-
surance fraud. See Insurance Fraud: The $20 Billion Disaster, REPORT THE
RIPOFF (Nat'l Ins. Crime Bureau, Palos Hills, Ill.), at 1.
179. See Lucky Auto Supply v. Turner, 244 Cal. App. 2d 872,885,53 Cal. Rptr.
628, 636 (1966) ("[O]ne person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich him-
self at the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or
for property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and
equitable that such restitution be made .... ").
180. See, e.g., Dan Morain, No-Fault Measure's Support Is Waning, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at A3 ("California's car insurance rates are the eighth-
highest in the nation, averaging $781 a year statewide. But in urban California,
especially Los Angeles, rates can be three times that amount or more.").
181. See generally People v. Guevara, 132 Cal. App. 3d 193, 201, 183 Cal. Rptr.
18, 23 (1982) (stating courts are overcrowded and calling for efficient use of judi-
cial resources); Barbara Babcock, Equal Justice-and a Defendant With the
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of needless and burdensome litigation, while serving the best inter-
ests of judicial economy.
2. Cases where full restitution is not ordered to the victim
Courts will not award full restitution in some cases. For in-
stance, in order to avoid double recovery, judges may chose not to
order restitution fines or include them as a probation condition' 1 In
other cases, prosecutors may not ask for full restitution. Both of
these situations frustrate the objectives of criminal restitution-
rehabilitation, deterrence, and providing actual and efficient com-
pensation to victims. Criminals are not deterred and are not guided
toward rehabilitation since they need not consciously face the full
consequences of their acts. An order of restitution to insurance com-
panies would impress upon criminals the full extent of their criminal
acts, including that losses occur despite the existence of insurance."
Actual and efficient compensation is not provided when the loss is
neither paid to the insurance company nor efficiently recovered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Providing full restitution to crime victims addresses important
needs of the criminal justice system. It serves to provide a rehabili-
tative and deterrent effect upon the offender, while also compensat-
ing the victims for their losses.
Allowing the broad interpretation of criminal restitution statutes
provides greater avenues of victim restitution. Under this approach,
judges have greater discretion in effectuating opportunities for re-
habilitating criminals, deterring future harms, and efficiently com-
pensating victims. Limiting restitution, on the other hand, stifles ju-
dicial discretion and thwarts the constitutional mandate to provide
restitution to all victims of crime. When this occurs criminals are less
aware of the real harm that they have caused and crime victims are
left unsatisfied. As Jeremy Bentham wrote,
Satisfaction is necessary in order to cause the evil of the
first class to cease, and reestablish every thing in the condi-
tion it was in before the offence; to replace the individual
Money to Exercise Every Right, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1994, at A26 (discussing a
criminal justice system of "understaffed prosecutors' offices, overcrowded court
dockets, and harried public defenders").
182. See generally People v. Fritchey, 2 Cal. App. 4th 829, 839, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
585, 591 (1992) (stating that courts have broad discretion in imposing restitution).
183. See Birkett, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 1444, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 591.
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who has suffered in the lawful condition in which he would
have been if the law had not been violated.1"
By granting review in the Birkett case, the supreme court has the
opportunity to remedy the effects of the Sexton ruling. In Sexton, the
First District Court of Appeal interpreted state law in a manner the
Legislature never intended. In denying insurance companies restitu-
tion when they suffer losses caused by crime, the court of appeal has
created an absurd result through inflexible statutory interpretation.
This ruling impedes the efficient and fair administration of the crimi-
nal restitution program in California and should be overturned.
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